



Abdillah Noh
University of Oxford

*Re-explaining Malay Nationalism:
The Path Dependent Argument*

Working Paper No.172

September 2011

The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Centre or Murdoch University. Working papers are considered draft publications for critical comments by colleagues and will generally be expected to be published elsewhere in a more polished form after a period of critical engagement and revision. Comments on this paper should be directed to the author at abdillah.noh@politics.ox.ac.uk.

© Copyright is held by the author(s) of each working paper: No part of this publication may be republished, reprinted or reproduced in any form without the permission of the paper's author(s).

National Library of Australia.
ISSN: 1037-4612



ABSTRACT

The paper argues that Malay nationalism in the twentieth century Malaya is a result of British administration's ability to temper *de facto* but not *de jure* Malay power. This inability to remove *de jure* Malay power set off a path dependent process where the colonial administration needed to continue to factor in Malay political presence in its policy calculations. This preservation of *de jure* Malay power brought about distributional consequences. It set in motion the development of Malay political and social capacities and gave rise to the creation of a network of Malay-based institutions which, in aggregate, brought about a rise in Malay political expression.

Keywords: Malay Nationalism, Path Dependency, British Malaya

INTRODUCTION

In his tour of the Malay States on the east coast of the Malay peninsula in 1838, Munsyi Abdullah, a Muslim scholar, described an apathetic Malay polity, where there existed ‘all kinds of taboos’ between the ruler and the ruled and that the Malay population could not ‘criticise the unreasonable conduct of kings without the risk of being sentenced to death.’¹

Slightly over a hundred years later, in 1946, the Malay masses were throwing their weight against Malay rulers in reaction to the British proposed Malayan Union. They felt that by agreeing to the proposal, the rulers had short changed Malay political rights. The Union would effectively spell the end of Malay political dominance as it would grant non-Malays citizenship status, employ equal citizenship rights and revoke some of Malay special status.² In an article in the influential newspaper, the *Majlis*, Ayob Abdullah, a political activist, reminded the Malay rulers of their responsibility towards the Malay masses.³ Ayob urged Malays to form political organisations since ‘they could no longer rely on their Rajas to defend their society.’⁴

The transformation from political apathy to political activism surprised even the drafters of the Malayan Union. Expressing the level of Malay political activism, Edward Gent who was one of the main architects of the Malayan Union proposal wrote to the State Secretary of the Colonies, saying:

‘I met representative of the Malay Nationalist (corrupt group) this morning and had long discussion with them on the basis of their memorandum. They stressed that, although in favour of the Union, their views were not shared in that respect by large body of Malay opinion, which it was essential to respect. They showed considerable apprehension of any substantial admission of non-Malays to citizenship rights.’⁵

What contributes to the transformation from political apathy to a determined and cogent portrayal of Malay nationalism in the twentieth century? Is the show of Malay nationalism in 1946 an ad hoc display or did the Malay polity go through a process that resulted in such transformation? If there is, how can we best explain that process?

These are the set of questions that this article attempts to explain. The paper argues that Malay nationalism is a result of British colonial administration’s inability to remove completely *de jure* Malay power, even if the administration managed to remove *de facto* Malay power. This inability to remove completely Malay *de jure* power is the result of British fear that a complete dismantling of Malay feudal structures could come with

considerable financial and political costs. However, British failure to remove *de jure* power set off a path dependence process where the administration needed to continue to factor in Malay political presence within its policy calculations. It created a set of self reinforcing institutions which not only engendered the development of Malay social and political capacities but also created a network of Malay-based institutions that, in aggregate, gave rise to Malay political expression. Put differently, this article argues that the preservation of *de jure* Malay power produced distributional consequences that helped create Malay based institutions that contributed to Malay nationalism.

The article hopes to offer a new explanation to Malay nationalism. To start, there are not many works on Malay nationalism and current works are mainly historiographical description (see works by (T.H. Silcock 1953; Soernarno 1960; Amri 1997; Roff 1967; Cheah 1988)). Even though they give good account of actors and issues involved, these works either describe aspects of Malay nationalism (Malay intellectuals, organisations) as separate and distinct or they prefer to be more specific and offer different snapshots of Malay nationalism (see for instance (Amri 1997; Cheah 1988; Emmanuel 2010). Take for instance one of the most important works on Malay nationalism by William Roff (1967). Even though it is entitled ‘Origins of Malay Nationalism’ the book is described ‘as the first sociological history of modern Malay Society’ and that it is centred on one aspect of nationalism where ‘new social and political elite groups form the core of his analysis.’⁶ Excellent as Roff’s work is, the Origins of Malay Nationalism do not explain the sources of this development. For instance, how is it possible that the twentieth century saw a rapid growth of Malay elites? More importantly, what made the British administration implement affirmative action policy for Malays in the twentieth century, when clearly it was possible for the administration to remove completely Malay political presence given Malays marginal economic and increasingly political role? Put differently, what triggered British change of policy towards Malays in the twentieth century when none was put in place before? Clearly, British affirmative action policy was out of character with the administration’s liberal values but this policy stance would prove to be instrumental in building up Malay capacities and in making affirmative action an enduring feature of the Malaysian polity.

The path dependent argument put forward here addresses these questions. By adopting the premise that it is the inability of the colonial administration to remove Malay *de jure* political presence at the apex of its power arrangement, the path dependent argument manages to tie the different development of Malay capacities with the creation and

accumulation of Malay based institutions that, together, gave rise to Malay political expression.

In arguing this case, we will highlight three critical episodes - the start of the Pangkor Treaty and the murder of J W Birch, the formation of the Federated Malay States and the Malayan Union Proposal. They are critical because these episodes saw attempts by the British administration, in varying degrees, to manage resources and to do away with existing Malay feudal arrangements for purpose of economic imperatives. The start of British official rule and the appointment of the first British Resident J W Birch for instance saw early British intention to dismantle fully Malay feudal structures through outright annexation of the state of Perak. This plan was abandoned after the murder of Birch and after the administration incurred heavy financial and political costs. It is this initial inability to fully dismantle Malay feudal arrangement that led to the creation of British policies that continued to factor Malay political presence. The formation of the Federated Malay States (FMS) was yet another attempt at managing Malay feudal arrangement to serve British economic imperative. However, the Birch's murder had built expectations on the part of British policy actors that saw them incorporating Malay political interest in their policy calculations. Rather than do away with Malay political symbols, the FMS created institutional structures that continued to retain Malay rulers as significant actors. More importantly, these institutions provided a platform for a more organised Malay demands and precipitated the formation of Malay centred institutions like Malay education and a Malay civil service. These developments were aided by other institutional networks like an active print media and Malay social and political organisations. These institutions reinforced each other and gave rise to new forms of political expressions. Finally, the Malayan Union was another attempt by the colonial administration to not only emasculate *de facto* Malay power but also remove *de jure* Malay power. However, the build up of Malay social and political capacities and the creation of institutional density and institutional networks in the twentieth century only led to a more vehement show of Malay political expression against the British proposal. In fact, the Malayan Union proposal serves only to reinstate Malay *de jure* political power.

The article proceeds as follows. The first part of the article will discuss briefly the concepts that are central to this article's argument; that is path dependence and the nature of self reinforcing mechanism. The second part of the chapter will describe three episodes that help shape Malay nationalism - the Pangkor Treaty and the murder of British first Resident JW Birch, the formation of the Federated Malay States, and the Malayan Union proposal. They will apply the concepts of path dependence and

describe the self reinforcing process mechanism that led to the growth of Malay political expression and nationalism. The article will conclude with some key points of and how path dependence could help future works that attempt to understand Malaysia's institutionalisation process.

PATH DEPENDENCE AND THE SELF REINFORCING MECHANISM

Path dependence has been increasingly employed to explain political and social processes and forms a central tenet in major works on state building (See Ertman(1997) Rokan (1975) Tilly and Ardant (1975)and Collier(1991)). The term is thrown to various definitions. Sewell(1996) defines path dependence as ' what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time.'⁷ Goldstone (1998) believes that 'a system that exhibits path dependency is one in which the outcomes are related stochastically to initial conditions.'⁸ Mahoney (2000) sees path dependence as 'specifically those historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties.'⁹ Levi (1997) perhaps provides a more lucid description of path dependence describing that

'(Path dependence has to mean) if it is to mean anything, that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other – and essential if the chosen branch dies – the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow.'¹⁰

These definitions suggest that path dependence involves two things. First, making that initial choice is important. Second, once a choice is made, self reinforcing mechanism sets in where 'each step in a particular direction makes it more difficult to reverse course.'¹¹ It is not that taking a reverse course is impossible. Rather, the choice of reversal is increasingly difficult because the cost of reversal increases over time. This will become clear when we discuss the mechanisms of path dependence.

What brings about path dependence and why do social, political and economic processes get stuck in a path dependent mode? Perhaps two most important works that deconstruct the logic of path dependence are those carried out by economic historians David (1985) and Arthur (1994). Using technology adoption as an example, they describe that

certain technologies, for idiosyncratic and unpredictable reasons, can achieve initial advantage over alternative technologies and prevail over time even when the alternative technologies could offer better efficiency. Arthur (1994) suggests that such path dependence is due to self reinforcing mechanisms. He describes four self reinforcing mechanisms that encourage path dependence. They are: large set up costs; learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations.¹² To put simply, the initial choice gets hard wired within an institutional setting and thus making it harder for existing institutions to adopt alternative technology.¹³

David's (1985) and Arthur's (1994) works have been extensively borrowed by political scientists. Perhaps one of the best efforts that imported David's (1985) and Arthur's (1994) works to political science and public policy is the one carried out by Pierson (2004). He argues that the source of path dependence and self reinforcing mechanism lies in the nature of public good inherent in politics and public policy. He says that the non excludable and non rivalrous nature of public good give rise to collective action problem, opacity in political decisions and the development of institutional density that encourage self reinforcing mechanisms. We discuss briefly these characteristics to show their relevance to the growth of Malay nationalism.

The Collective Nature of Politics

In an economic market, there is no need for coordination of decision. Consumers make their decision independent of others because ultimately the market will decide on the optimum choice. In contrast, in a political 'market' individuals tend to decide based on what they expect others to decide. The reason is due to the non excludable and non rivalrous nature of public good that encourages free riding. Given the limitation, achieving political objectives involves collective action, where actors coordinate their efforts in making policy choices. For example, in choosing the 'right' horse, individual form expectations of what others will decide. This cumulative expectation on what the 'right' horse should be encourages self reinforcing mechanism. This is because the fear of picking the 'wrong' horse, which could come at considerable costs, encourages actors to constantly adjust their behaviour in line with what they expect others to act.¹⁴ In other words, actors tend to 'adapt' their expectation, resulting in self reinforcing process. The murder of J W Birch as result of his move to remove completely Malay feudal rule, caused policy actors in the coming years to adapt their expectation on future decisions because 'betting the wrong horse' could come at a considerable cost. British decision to form the Conference of Rulers, the Federal Council, to

promote Malay education and Malay appointment in the civil service, are the result of such adaptive expectations, fearing that anything less could result in political and financial costs. These expectations create self reinforcing mechanisms that allow for the continuation of Malay *de jure* power. As Pierson puts it ‘despite massive social, economic, and political changes over time, self-reinforcing dynamics associated with collective action process – especially high start-up costs, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations – mean that organisations will have a strong tendency to persist once they are institutionalised.’¹⁵

Institutional density

Path dependence is perpetuated by the prevalence of institutions. Institutions are ‘the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the human devised constraints that shape human interaction.’¹⁶ Going by this definition public policies are part of institutions because policies are ‘grounded in law and backed by the coercive power of the state’ and they ‘signal to actors what has to be done, what cannot be done, and establish many of the rewards and penalties associated with particular activities.’¹⁷

Institutions bring about self reinforcing mechanisms because, as North(1994) and David(1985), point out creating institutions involve high fixed costs, learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations.¹⁸ Institutions tend to make actors invest in specialised skills, create mental maps over social and political realities and encourage the growth of networks with other individuals and organisations. This ‘institutional density’ only encourages actors to adopt the chosen path as any reversal would be costly. In Malaya’s case, British policies to continue incorporating Malay *de jure* power led to continued investment in institutions that encourage further the consolidation of Malay *de jure* power. The promotion of a specialised Malay administrative service within the civil service, the provision of Malay education and the growth of Malay organisations, for instance, all reflect the continued factoring of Malay *de jure* power which would lead to the growth of Malay nationalism.

The Complexity and Opacity of Politics

The complexity and opacity associated with politics also encourage self reinforcing mechanism. Unlike economics where performance can be easily measured through the price mechanism, political outcomes are more difficult to assess. The nature of public good means that goals are more complex, at times ambiguous and hence not easily measured. Given its complex nature, identifying problems in public policy becomes problematic. The instruments used to identify a policy problem are less exacting (reports, surveys, suggestions, referendum,

voting etc) and solutions are carried out on a trial and error basis. The nature of public policy also means that there is usually a lag time between identifying a problem and making the solution. Solutions are also difficult due to the multifaceted nature of policy objectives. Given such ‘noise’ political markets are ‘more prone to inefficiency’ because it is ‘difficult to measure what is being exchanged in political markets and in consequence to enforce agreements.’¹⁹

The complexity and opacity of policy decision only encourage actors to go for the ‘tried and tested’ solution, in short, taking a path dependent mode. The adoption of old and tested methods are employed because actors would tend to ‘filter information into existing mental maps’ where ‘confirming information tends to be incorporated, while disconfirming information is filtered out.’²⁰ Put differently, actors succumb to learning and coordination effects as they tend to stick to a given technology or a given approach in addressing a policy problem. Work by Berman (2003) and Wuthnow (1989) for instance testify to these self reinforcing mode when they suggest that once views reached a critical mass they will generate ‘ a set of culture – producing institutions, organisations and specialised actors that greatly facilitate the spread and reproduction of that ideology.’²¹ In the Malayan case, it is evident that, in spite of the emerging plural nature of Malaya in the twentieth century, British policy actors continued to employ ‘tried and tested’ solutions that would allow for the continuation of Malay *de jure* power and at the same time promote peaceful economic activity. This ‘tried and tested’ solution led to the reinforcement of institutions (civil service, education, political organisation) that contributed to the spread of Malay nationalism.

The above are just few of the important self reinforcing mechanisms inherent in the delivery of public good. Suffice it to say these mechanisms underline British colonial policies and the perpetuation of Malay based institutions in the twentieth century which, in aggregate, gave rise to Malay nationalism. We turn now to a full description of how British colonial policy calculations allowed for the institutionalisation of Malay political expression.

THE START OF BRITISH RULE, J W BIRCH AND THE RETRACTION OF MALAY POLITICAL POWER.

British policies in the early years after the Pangkor Treaty of 1874 would prove to be critical as they set the tone for future British policies with regards to indigenous power. In these early years, British policy was geared towards redistributing economic and political resources for purpose of economic development and this involved managing Malaya’s significant actors. In

these early years efforts were made to dismantle Malay feudal arrangement which was seen as incompatible to British-style capitalism. This period saw Straits Governor William Jervois and Perak's first Resident J W Birch, attempting to revamp Malay feudal arrangement and put in its place an administrative system that would serve British economic imperatives. JW Birch introduced a new administration and property right laws. State revenue and expenditure were now handled by British appointed administrators. Taxes and charges on the use of river ways were now carried out by British appointed officers and police force. To streamline revenue, Birch imposed a unified taxation for opium, spirits and gambling. Literally overnight, Birch eliminated the influence of Malay chiefs and denied Malay chiefs' access to traditional sources of revenue, which came from taxing resources under their territorial control²².

However it was Birch's final initiative to do away completely with Malay feudal rule by annexing Perak - which meant direct British rule - that put paid to British intention to fully dismantle Malay political presence. Birch was murdered on November 1875, orchestrated by Malay chiefs and led by Sultan Abdullah, the very prince who was the key figure in initiating the start of British rule. Birch's murder sparked political unrests in Perak. The need to quell the unrests came at a financial cost to the British government. The crisis saw the British government spending some £71,074 to bring peace to Perak.²³

The Birch's episode prompted the administration to scale back from making major revamp to Malay administrative structures. It was clear to the colonial administration that the costs involved in quelling unrests (first in Perak and then smaller political skirmishes in Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang in the later years) outweighed the benefit of a complete removal of Malay political dominance. This policy posture would guide British future rule of engagement with the Malay States.

This new posture is evident from the numerous notes sent by the Colonial Office to Straits officers where the Colonial Office made clear that any repeat of the Perak disturbance would be costly to the British government.²⁴ The office called on Straits Governor to remind Residents to play the proper role of advisers, to work closely with native rulers and not to exercise too much discretion at removing Malay administrative system. Lord Carnarvon for instance was damning on Governor Jervois for bypassing the colonial office by initiating a full annexation of Perak. He wrote:

'...I am at a loss to understand how a careful and experienced observer should fail to recognise in them from first to last a clear and consistent series of

directions calculated to keep before both your predecessor and yourself the nature and extent of relations which the British residents had been permitted by her Majesty's Government to hold with the native authorities....those relations had been violently interrupted...[and] the signal for resistance and attack was in opposition to the whole tenor of my directions...'²⁵.

In 1878, in a letter to reverse an earlier decision by Selangor Resident to suspend a Malay State council member, the Straits Governor William Robinson gave a warning saying that

'The Residents have been placed in the Native states as advisers, not as rulers, and if they take upon themselves to disregard this principle they will most assuredly be held responsible if trouble springs out of their neglect of it.'²⁶

Indeed, the Perak crisis slowed the process of change in the Malay States. The appointment of Hugh Low as Perak Resident after Birch's death saw a more gradual administrative changes. Hugh was acquainted with Malay political arrangement. And unlike Birch's reform act, Malay chiefs were brought into administration and paid wages to offset their lost in revenue as a result of a centralised tax revenue collection.

It must however be said that Malay *de facto* power continued to diminish. By the 1890s, the British administration had removed vestiges of feudal administrative practices including debt bondage and *corvee* labour. And even when Malay rulers still held leadership within state's power structure they were ceremonial figures. During state council meetings, Malay rulers played secondary role to British Residents in making policy decisions, despite them being president of the council. This dichotomy between *de jure* and *de facto* power is best summed up by the words of Acting Governor Maxwell who states that:

'The powers of the Resident are not confined to the enforcement of the few written laws which state possesses. In special cases he may exercise in the name of the Sultan, the authority which His Highness undoubtedly possess, of passing order or sentence which may seem to be just, subject to the instructions, special or general, of the Governor.'²⁷

However, despite a diminished *de facto* power the continued preservation of Malay rulers as sovereign, symbolic it may be, proves to be crucial. Birch's murder and the financial costs incurred had built expectations on the part of British administration that prompted it to continue to take into consideration Malay political role in its policy calculations. This preservation of Malay *de jure* power would bring about distributional consequences which allowed for the growth of Malay social and political capacities and the development of

institutions that would pave the way for growing Malay political expression. This preservation would be apparent in the coming years. We turn now to the formation of the Federated Malay States (FMS), an important period that saw the creation of a dense Malay institutional network.

FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL MALAY STATES, INSTITUTIONS AND MALAYS NEW SET OF DEMANDS

The formation of the Federated Malay States in 1896 brought together the states of Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan under a common administration. As Emerson (1964) points out the FMS was meant to ‘centralise control, lessen state’s autonomy in order to protect the interest of new political and economic actors.’²⁸ In short, the FMS was yet another attempt by the colonial administration to manage incompatible Malay feudal structures.

The FMS diminished further Malay *de facto* power. Under the new arrangement, there would be a secretariat in Kuala Lumpur headed by a Resident General, not the Malay rulers. The Resident General would in turn report to the High Commissioner in Singapore. British Resident from each state would also report to the Resident General. The FMS also did away with individual Malay states own set of codes; under the new arrangement there would be a common legal, taxation and land settlement codes.²⁹

However, the FMS and its attendant institutions continued to factor in Malay *de jure* power. For instance, the FMS introduced new institutional arrangement; the Conference of Malay Rulers. The Conference represents the paradox of British policy. It diminished Malay *de facto* power without injuring *de jure* power. For instance, the Conference did not grant the rulers legislative power; it merely served to remind the Malay rulers of their special position within the administration. This ‘special’ role assumed by Malay actors is amply portrayed in the description below.

‘The Rulers themselves, despite the idea of the advisory conference, tended to be rather left out of the administrative scene; no arrangements were made for holding the conferences at regular intervals and, in an interval of several years...The Resident General became a policy maker almost in his own right. It was not only Malay leaders from the State Councils (as well as the Sultans) who felt they should have some say in the government; the mining, trading and planting concerns began to press for some established form of representation in the government so that their views could be given, especially on subjects which affected them directly.’³⁰

The FMS also created another instrument that diminished Malay *de facto* power without compromising Malays *de jure* position - the Federal Council. The council was in effect a 'council of all state councils' and formed in 1909. With the Federal Council, policies that were deemed important to all states were now decided at the federal level.³¹ The Federal Council relegated further the position of Malay rulers. For instance, in the Council's hierarchy, the High Commissioner was made President of the Federal Council, not the Malay rulers. In fact, below the High Commissioner was the Resident General. The four Malay rulers only came after the Resident General, and below them four unofficial members. These unofficial members were drawn from European and Chinese business interest. What's more, these unofficial members were recommended, not by the Malay rulers, but by the High Commissioner with the approval of his Majesty, the King of England. Clearly the Council emasculated further Malay *de facto* power. As Emerson (1964) describes

'Whatever the legal niceties of the matter, the practical result of the Agreement was to reduce the rulers' role one step lower. In the council the Sultans were on the same level as any ordinary member, including their own subjects. None of them could ever preside under the Standing Orders and they had no veto and no rights not possessed by other members except for representation in absence.'³²

However, despite the dilution of Malay power, the creation of institutions like the Conference of Rulers and the Federal Council demonstrates that the colonial administrators continued to have expectations that policies needed to be built around Malay political consideration. This continued preservation of Malay *de jure* power provided enough leverage that paved the way for the consolidation of Malay dominance in the coming years. It generated distributional consequences that created institutions that would lead to the development of Malay political and social capacities. In fact, the twentieth century would see a dense Malay institutional network that would play a key role in the build up of Malay nationalism. We turn now to some of these institutional capacities that helped in the promotion of Malay nationalism.

The FMS, Malay Rulers and Pan Malay Consciousness

One significant by product of the FMS is that it gave rise to a pan Malay consciousness. The formation of the FMS and attendant institutions like the Conference of Rulers and the Federal Council, for the first time, brought Malay rulers together and created an awareness of 'Malaya' as a political entity.³³ Unwittingly, the FMS encouraged Malay rulers to approach issues from a pan Malay perspective. This unprecedented level of cooperation was expressed by Frank Swettenham, the Resident General, who said that 'so far, as I am aware no Ruler of

any of the four States had ever previously visited a neighbouring Sultan with peaceful and friendly intentions.’³⁴ The Malay rulers echoed Swettenham’s sentiment. At the first meeting of the rulers’ conference in 1897, the Malay rulers expressed the significance of the ceremony saying that

‘We, the Sultans of the Malay States of Selangor, Perak, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan, by the invitation of Your Majesty’s High Commissioner, are met together for the first time in history to discuss the affairs of our States confederated under Your Majesty’s gracious protection’³⁵

More significantly, the FMS triggered new Malay political capacities as it created institutions that provided a more organised platform for articulating social, political and economic interest. The self reinforcing mechanism that comes from such institutional arrangement became apparent in the twentieth century. With the FMS, Malay rulers started to look and discuss issues that went beyond the concern of their individual state. The rulers started to voice displeasure over the dilution of the executive and legislative role of Malay rulers and state councils. One of the vocal critics of the Federal arrangement was the Sultan of Perak, Sultan Idris. At the second meeting of the Durbar of Rulers in July 1903, the Sultan commented on the confusion of the word Federation when he said:

‘.....if however, the four states were amalgamated into one, would it be right to say that one state assisted the other, because assistance implies something more than one, for if there is only one, which is the helper and which is the helped? A Malay proverb says that there cannot be two masters to one vessel; neither can there be four Rulers over one country.’³⁶

In 1905, Sultan Idris complained that the new arrangement contravened the Treaty of the Federation as it bypassed the authority of the Resident which in effect.³⁷ In a visit to London in 1924, Sultan Iskandar of Perak, met with the King and British officials from the colonial office and expressed his displeasure over the FMS arrangement. He also gave a memorandum to the colonial office requesting that ‘the original treaty (the Pangkor Engagement) should be followed in its exact terms...and that the rulers should be treated as the ruler with the Resident to carry out on his behalf and with his cooperation policies decided upon in consultation with a stronger state council.’³⁸

The demands made by the Malay rulers to re-evaluate the Federal agreement were heeded. In the year after Sultan Iskandar’s visit to London in 1924, Governor Guillemard

made major changes to the federal arrangement. The new arrangement provided more decision making powers to Residents and State councils.³⁹

In another show that demonstrates growing political capacities, the Malay rulers asked to be withdrawn from the Federal Council as they felt that it was unfit for Malay rulers to be part of the Federal Council and to be among other appointed commoners. An Upper House, similar to the House of Lords, was designed to accommodate Malay rulers. And in place of the Malay rulers in the Federal Council, three unofficial Malay members were appointed to the house in 1927. In the later years Malay members like Raja Chulan and Dato Abdullah b. Haji Dahan were active in voicing out Malay issues especially pertaining to education.⁴⁰

Clearly, the FMS has brought a change in the articulation of Malay leaders. We look now at how the formation of the FMS played an important role in mobilising issues that developed further Malay political and social capacities. Two issues will be discussed – Malay education and Malay appointment in the civil service.

Education Policy

The second Conference of Rulers in 1903 saw Malay rulers highlighting the need for the administration to speed up on Malay development agenda. The rulers recorded their unease at the socio-economic under-development of Malays. They felt that the need to address this issue was urgent given that the formation of the FMS had encouraged the ‘increasingly alien and non-Malay character of government.’⁴¹

The rulers’ remarks prompted the colonial administration to address Malay education and to make ‘the provision of special facilities to instruct Malays to become useful public servants.’⁴² The conference gave rise to a report on Malay education. Prepared by the Director of Education, R J Wilkinson, the report proposed the setting of ‘a residential school for the education of Malays of good family, and for training of Malay boys for admission to certain branches of the Government service.’⁴³ The proposal was the first comprehensive initiative that addressed Malay education as prior to this, education was not among the administration list of top priorities.⁴⁴ Before 1890, there was no education department in any of the Malay States. Pahang and Negeri Sembilan for example did not have full time trained education officers until early twentieth century. Until the 1920s only about 1.5 percent of total state revenue was allotted to education.⁴⁵

Wilkinson’s proposal for a Malay education was initially met with lukewarm response by the High Commissioner who ‘have some doubts as to the ultimate success of the scheme’ but nevertheless relented and agreed to provide the building of such a school in 1905, but

only ‘as an experiment for three years’.⁴⁶ This reservation however proved unfounded. In the years to come the school, despite being highly under resourced, performed exceedingly well. As Wilkinson notes

‘whatever happens the results now obtained will eventually dispose of the fiction that the Malays are not capable of being instructed. That 21 boys in a small school of 80, badly housed and ill-equipped, should pass a very stiff seventh standard examination shows that a few good schools could soon supply our Government offices with every clerk we need and make us independent of the Jaffna Tamil.’⁴⁷

The school unexpected achievement convinced British authority to establish a permanent school. In 1909 the school moved to a new site in Kuala Kangsar and named the Malay College. In the coming years, the College not only prepared Malay boys for administrative roles but also graduates who would later serve in Malay nationalistic struggle. Some of its famous graduates include Ishak Mohd who was instrumental in setting up the left wing political party, the Kesatuan Kaum Muda(KMM), Tengku Ismail Tengku Yasin who set up the Selangor Malay Association, a political organisation and Onn Jaafar who would later found the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) .

Befitting the self reinforcing effect, the success of the school paved the way for more demands for Malay education even when there was fear of Malay ‘over – education’ and the political risks that could come with education. This fear was expressed clearly by R.H. Kenion when he said:

‘You can teach Malays so that they do not lose their skills and craft in fishing and jungle work. Teach them the dignity of manual labour, so that they do not all become Kranies (clerks) and I am sure you will not have the trouble which has arisen in India through over-education.’⁴⁸

Despite these reservations, policy reversal was not an option. The twentieth century was a different period. British initial policy had set in motion a demand for Malay education. More importantly, Malay expectations were different, brought about by economic development and modernisation. The initial success of Malay education had raised expectations even on the part of British officers. It is not a surprise that the Malay College was followed by the setting up of the Sultan Idris Training College (SITC) in 1922. The SITC however, was meant to be a vocational school. The justification for a vocational school came from Richard Windstedt, who came with up the Windstedt report , who said that ‘ the bulk of the inhabitants must turn

to agriculture and other industries' and that '(a)ny ideal of education, not adjusted to local wants, must lead to economic dislocation and social unrest.'⁴⁹ The Report called for the removal of the fifth standard in Malay schools and to replace it with modules in drawing, horticulture, and basket making so as to teach Malays the 'dignity of manual labour.'⁵⁰

However Windstedt's initial objective went beyond expectations as the SITC produced more than just vocational graduates. Instead of just producing horticulturalists, the college became a centre for Malay literary activity. The college drew Malay students from across the peninsula and quickly became a meeting place for bright Malay youths. In fact, the collegial atmosphere created a common Malay consciousness and produced a Malay intelligentsia some of whom became leading scholars and nationalist figures.⁵¹ Prominent Malay personalities associated with the college include Zainal Abidin Ahmad or Zaaba, a prominent writer and scholar who headed the Translation Bureau at the college until 1939. Another of SITC prominent graduate was Ibrahim Yaacob who later formed the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM), a Malaya radical nationalist party in 1938.⁵²

The growth of Malay education coincided with a time when there was increasing calls by Malay leaders for more Malays to be part of the civil service. This call also came at a time when the British administration was reducing its recruitment of British officers where in 1902, the Resident General announced that any further recruitment could only come with an 'urgent necessity' and that nothing 'will justify any further increase of European officers in any department, and it is the policy of Government to train and employ natives and residents of the country in all subordinate positions in the service.'⁵³ We turn now to another British policy that help enhanced Malay social and political capacities – the civil service.

Civil Service

Recruitment of trained Malays into the civil service started in earnest only in 1910 with the introduction of the Malay Administrative Service (MAS) - almost 40 years after the Pangkor Treaty.⁵⁴ Together with the MAS, a Malay Probationer Scheme (MPS) was also introduced. The MPS was a recruitment scheme where Malay boys were handpicked by Residents and put through a three year course at the Malay College to undergo courses in correspondence, treasury and basic administration. The best of these graduates would then be placed under the newly introduced Malay Administrative Service(MAS).⁵⁵ These schemes came on the heels of a conjuncture of events; the formation of the FMS, the increased calls by Malay rulers for more Malay administrators, the emphasis on Malay education and the need for local administrators due to the freeze on recruitment of British officers.

Though the MAS was a commendable start towards increasing Malay administrative capacity, the MAS was never an equal of the elite Malayan Civil Service (MCS). The MAS was described as ‘a very junior branch of the Malayan Civil Service.’⁵⁶ Malay officers played ancillary roles in the British administration. Malays did not involve themselves in the central bureaucracy but rather dealt with routine administrative tasks. Malay officers were confined to duties in rural areas, as settlement officers to the land office or as ‘Malay assistant secretaries’. Promotion was slow and the remuneration was unattractive. It was difficult for Malays to get into the prestigious Malayan Civil Service (MCS).

However, the introduction of the MAS paved the way for more Malay involvement in the civil service. In the years after its introduction, Malay officers and Malay rulers started to express their unhappiness over the scheme. In 1917, a memorandum to revise the scheme described Malay grievances noting that ‘the practice of relegating for a period of three years...to the work and status of a third class clerk, results in producing, not unnaturally, a sense of dissatisfaction or even a distaste for further service with the government.’⁵⁷ In 1919, the High Commissioner pointed out the need for more Malays in the civil service saying the need for Malays ‘to take their proper place in the administration and commercial life of these states.’⁵⁸ In 1921, qualified Malays were allowed entry to the MCS directly.

But it was in 1922 that there was a major overhaul of Malay civil service recruitment. That year, the Retrenchment Commission came up with wide ranging policies that included affirmative policy that gave preference to Malays rather than non Malays in government service. The commission proposed that the proportion of Malays to local born non Malays in the civil service should ultimately be in the ratio seven to three.⁵⁹ Between 1921 and 1931 ten posts were reserved for Malay officers. In 1923, British Residents of the FMS urged the government to absorb more Malays into the Railways and the Postal and Telegraph Department.⁶⁰ In 1923, Guillemard, the High Commissioner in response to demands to include more Malays to the civil service wrote to the Colonial Office that ‘every effort is being made to bring forward the people of the country to take part in the various departments of Government’⁶¹. In fact the General Orders for the FMS specified that ‘Malays must receive preference in filling all vacancies in the subordinate ranks of government employment.’⁶² Malay employability in the service was also aided by the setting up of two English schools in 1924 in the rural district of Bagan Serai and Lenggong in Perak. A Free English Education Class was implemented for students in Malay vernacular schools. In 1924, Special Malay Class was introduced in English schools, to afford Malays with English education. In fact,

within a span of ten years, enrolment of Malays in English schools shot up from a low of just 800 in 1923 to about 2464 in 1933 – an increase of more than 200 percent.⁶³

There was added pressure to provide Malays with higher administrative tasks. In a Federal Council proceeding in 1934, Abdullah Dahan, one of the more vocal Malay representatives gave a cutting remark that British policy on Malay civil service recruitment had not gone far enough, saying :

‘ It is no doubt pleasing to see so many Malay peons, Malay messengers, Malay punkah-pullers, Malay sailors, Malay police constables and Malay gateman in the employment of railways, but, sir, the Malays also desire to have a fair share of the higher posts.’⁶⁴

Consistent with the path dependent argument, British policies exceeded initial expectations and served only to raise more expectation. British affirmative action that allowed Malays exclusive civil service positions triggered more demands by elites for more Malay participation in the administration, which without doubt increased Malay institutional capacity in the twentieth century. As Roff (1967) puts it the exclusive MCS provided ‘ the principal avenue by which Malays might acquire in the modern world the authority that was slipping from them in the old’ and brought about the ‘emergence of a new Malay leadership group, English-educated and increasingly influenced by Western ideas of government and social organisation.’⁶⁵

In fact, institutions created in the twentieth century only makes the British administration accidental flag bearers of Malay nationalism. We look now at the density of Malay institutional network in the twentieth century manifested in the growth of Malay journalism and social and political organisations.

Malay Journalism and Institutional Density.

Although the first Malay Muslim publication was the Jawi Peranakan established in 1876, it was only in the twentieth century that we see significant growth in Malay journalism. This growth in Malay journalism coincided with the formation of the FMS and a period that saw a growing band of Malay-Muslim scholars who were beneficiaries of an improved economy and an expanded education system.

An interesting observation is that from the 1920s, Malay publications started to gravitate towards the Malay States, rather than Singapore and Penang; about the time when Malay education started to see more Malay professionals. Between 1904 and 1917, for

instance, there were no Malay publications in the Malay States. ⁶⁶ However between the years 1920 – 1930, out of 34 new vernacular newspapers, twenty were published in the Malay States. ⁶⁷ And despite the global depression, the 1930s saw a proliferation of Malay publications. In the period 1930 – 1941, there were eighty one new Malay periodicals and journals. In the period 1935 - 1936, alone, there were 25 new Malay publications.⁶⁸ Some of the prominent publications were the *Saudara* (1926- 1941), *Warta Malaya* (1930 – 1941), *Lembaga* (1935 – 41) and *Utusan Melayu* (1939 – 41).

More tellingly, Malay publications gave the added voice for Malay nationalism. Malay newspapers in the twentieth century were more than just newspapers. As Emmanuel(2010) describes, Malay newspapers were really ‘views papers’ as they became sites for pan –Malay developmental concerns and Malay nationalism. These publications carried ‘new forms of public opinion making like the editorial, increased participation in the media through letters to the editor and contributors’ articles, public readings of newspaper, and the extension of newspapers into classrooms.’⁶⁹

The *Al – Imam* for instance, despite its Islamic bent, ran editorials that discussed Malay capacities. One article ‘*Sa-elok Pekerjaan Itu: Barang yang bersangatan hajat umat kepada – nya*(The proper Task: What is most needed in our People) for instance stress the need to improve capacity, suggesting

‘.....we are most in need of skills of craftsmanship and agriculture or knowledge of how to preserve our country from its enemies, or that we need education to rescue use from the slough of apathy and indolence, or that we must learn to unite for the common good...All this is true. But the one thing that will strengthen and realise all our desires is knowledge of the commands of our religion. For religion is the proven cure for all the ills of our community.’⁷⁰

Articles on Malay development or underdevelopment grew in intensity in the 1920s and 1930s. They did not merely concentrate on Malays lack of capacity but increasingly towards Malays development vis a vis the non Malays. In a pique article, in the *Malay Mail*, Za’aba criticised Malays for failing to keep up with the changed environment. In his article ‘The Poverty of Malays’ he wrote

‘The Malays, as a whole, are a particularly poor people. Poverty is their most outstanding characteristic and their greatest handicap in the race of progress. Poor in money, poor in education, poor in intellectual equipment and moral qualities, they cannot be otherwise but left behind in the march of nations..... They are not naturally of poor intellect, or incapable of high morals. Potentially, they possess

such qualities as much as do any other people. But the actualised part of this potentiality is still poor to bear comparison with what we find in other progressive peoples in the country.’⁷¹

Another publication, the *Saudara* highlights the advances made by the so called ‘*bangsa bangsa asing*’ (alien population) and suggests that the colonial administration initiate policies to encourage Malays economic participation. An article in *Saudara* for instance highlights the enormous stride made by non Malays, noting that

‘ A nation’s progress, strength and well being are the result of economic development and it is no surprise to see the alien population progressing [due to their economic progress] at such a speed that they are now urging the government for access to the Malayan Civil Service. The rate of economic progress of the alien population is in sharp contrast to the progress made by Malays who are still poor, backward and weak. These qualities should never be a part of the Malays, in their own land.’⁷²

Malays’ fear of political and economic obsolescence was stoked further by comments made by non Malays regarding British policies and the consequent of Malaya’s emerging plural society. The British writer A J Toynbee in his book *A Journey to China or Things Which Are Seen* - which was quoted in the *Majaallah Guru* – said that he was convinced of the dominance of the Chinese in Malaya’s political economy noting that

.....the race for wealth and power remains between the British and the Chinese. The prize will fall to those who can stand the climate and other geographical conditions of the country. But I have not the slightest doubt of the conclusion of this peaceful race: the Chinese will win..... A truly significant mark that the British Empire can leave in Malaya when she withdraws is the transformation of this country into the Nineteenth Province of China⁷³

In a separate article, the *Majaallah Guru*⁷⁴ published an assessment by another British writer Somerville, D.C., who highlighted in his book that:

‘Perhaps the days of the Malays are over, but their end does not come from us. It comes from their more industrious fellow Asiatic, the Chinese. What we can do to elevate them, has already been done.’⁷⁵

The role of Malay publications and Malay elites in rallying Malay nationalism would not be complete without mentioning the *Utusan Melayu*. The *Utusan Melayu* (not the earlier *Utusan*) was founded in 1939, through an effort by a group of Malay journalists and activists

who wanted a publication that ‘would be owned and financed as well as staffed by Malays of the Archipelago.’⁷⁶

In its early years, *Utusan Melayu* articles did not veer too much from other mainstream Malay newspapers, touching mainly on issues of Malay underdevelopment. But in later years, the publication became flag bearer of Malay nationalism. The *Utusan Melayu* for instance often invoked the term *Bangsa Melayu* (the Malay race) rather than the particular traditional attachment to the *Kerajaan* (the state) or *raja* (the monarchy).⁷⁷ *Utusan* publications were also peppered with terms like *negeri* (statehood), *tanah ayer/watan* (indigenous) and *tanah Melayu* (Malay land).⁷⁸ These terms are powerful invocation of ‘Malayness’ that created a coherent Malay political consciousness which was aided further by an increasingly educated Malay population who were more aware of their place in the development process.⁷⁹ At times too, the paper made pungent remarks on non-Malays, particularly Chinese. Some of the *Utusan Melayu* more scathing articles include articles like ‘*Orang Melayu di-perbuat seperti lembu*’ (*Malays treated like cattle*) and ‘*Negeri Besar – Rakyat Miskin*’ (*Great Country – Poor People*).⁸⁰

It would be apparent that there was growing institutional density built around Malay nationalism.⁸¹ Of special note is that these publications were fronted by Malay intellectuals who would go on to become leading figures in Malay nationalist cause. Some of these figures included, Syakh Mohd. Tahir Jalaluddin Al-Azhari, Sayyid Shaykh Ahmad Al Hadi, Zainal Abidin Ahmad (better known as Zaaba), Abdul Rahim Kajai, Eunus Abdullah, Onn Jaafar and Burhannuddin Helmi.

Also, Malay intellectuals held multiple appointments holding various appointments as editors, civil servants and activists in Malay organisations. These multiple appointments helped in the transmission of Malay political expression development as it created a symmetrical articulation of nationalism across Malay institutions.⁸²

The proliferation of Malay publications also came at a time when there was rapid growth of Malay social and political organisations which would add further momentum to Malay nationalism. We turn to this next.

Malay Organisations and Nationalism

Malay organisational life is really a product of the twentieth century. Other than those organised around the aristocracy, Malays did not have a pan- Malay political and social organisation until after the twentieth century. These new forms of Malay social and political organisation came from a concatenation factors; the dismantling of the feudal economy, the

expansion of the modern economic mode of production, the formation of the FMS, the increasing accessibility of education and the formation of a less stratified nature of Malay society.

The first Malay social and political organisation ironically was formed in Singapore, the seat of the most rapid change to Malay social life. The *Kesatuan Melayu Singapura* (KMS) or the Singapore Malay Union was formed in 1926. The KMS objectives included: to pursue Malay social, political and economic interest by making representation to the British administration; to advance Malay progress in the political, economic and social fields and to encourage Malay education.⁸³

Among KMS' achievement include its ability to convince the Straits government to set up a Malay Settlement in Singapore in 1929 similar to the Malay Settlement (Kampong Bahru) in Kuala Lumpur to prevent further displacement of Malays from urban areas.⁸⁴ Another of its achievement is that the KMS saw the emergence of non-traditional source of Malay leadership other than Malay aristocratic class. The KMS founding fathers were Eunus Abdullah, Yusof Ishak and Embuk Suloh, all from non aristocratic background. Eunus Abdullah was also the first Malay representative in the Straits Legislative Council.

But more importantly, the KMS set the pace for the formation of many other quasi Malay political organisations in the Malay States. In September 1937, a group of Malay professionals set up the *Persatuan Melayu Perak* (Perak Malay Association) (PMA). Though the PMA stated on the outset that it was set up to pursue social and economic objectives, the political objective was never far off from its members' mind where some members confessed that 'secretly' they held ambition of ending British rule.⁸⁵ The Perak Malay Association was followed by the establishment of the *Persatuan Melayu Pahang* (Pahang Malay Association) on March 1938, founded by the likes of Tengku Ahmad, a member of the Pahang royal house and Dato' Hussein Mohd a senior administrative officer in the Malayan Civil Service. In the same year, the *Persatuan Melayu Selangor* (PMS) was formed by Tengku Ismail, a member of the Selangor aristocracy. The PMS mooted various initiatives. A notable one was the setting up of an educational fund to sponsor students for education in the Middle East and Europe. The PMS also requested the setting up of a Malay university and for the colonial administration to expand Malay educational opportunities. It also made other demands like setting up of a Malay Regiment and a Malay air force and imposing restriction on migration from outside the Malay Archipelago.⁸⁶

The 1930s also saw the establishment of Malay left wing movement. One prominent Malay left wing movement was the *Kesatuan Melayu Muda* (KMM). Founded in 1938 by

Ibrahim Yaacob, a graduate of the Sultan Idris Training College (SITC), the KMM was an outgrowth of the Belia Malaya (Malaya Youth), a loose group established by students of SITC in the early 1930s.⁸⁷ The KMM drew its membership from Malay teachers and graduates of the SITC and the newly established Serdang Agricultural School. Besides Yaacob Ibrahim, another prominent member of the KMM was Ishak Mohd, a former officer in the Malay Administrative Service.

The KMM adopted a more militant political struggle with its leadership persuaded by Indonesia's (Dutch East Indies) political struggle.⁸⁸ Yaacob Ibrahim saw KMM's struggle as one that 'neither professed loyalty to the Sultans and the British nor spoke of non cooperation, but worked towards the nationalist feelings and teachings among its members, whose strength lay in the lower classes'⁸⁹ It held thoughts of a political union with Dutch Indonesia or to form an ambitious union encompassing the Borneo States, the Dutch East Indies and even the Philippines.⁹⁰

Despite its alternative political philosophy, KMM's political struggle found little traction with the larger Malay population. The passing of Malay feudal rule was still new and the larger Malay population viewed KMM's anti-imperialist and republican stance difficult to digest. The KMM's failure to gain support could also be due to its leadership that at times gave mixed signals as to the party's political struggle. Even its famous founding member, Ishak Mohd gave conflicting remarks of the KMM's struggle. In contrast to Ibrahim Yaacob's more militant stance, Ishak said that the KMM had no desire to remove the British colonialist but served to 'stop Malays being exploited by other races.' Ibrahim Yaacob on the other hand, was bent on ending British rule and in early 1939 he established a pact with the Japanese government just before the Japanese invasion of Malaya. With Japanese support, Ibrahim acquired the daily Malay newspaper *Warta Malaya* to launch propaganda against the British authority.⁹¹

This momentum of Malay political and social organisation was given a boost when the first pan-Malay National Congress was held in 1939. The novelty of the congress encouraged delegates to make fervent initiatives. Among the initiatives included the setting up of a Pan- Malayan Malay association called the *Persekutuan Persatuan Persatuan Melayu Semenanjung Tanah Melayu* (Union of Malay Associations of the Malay Peninsula). The congress also agreed to declare the 6th of August as the Malay national day or '*Hari Kebangsaan Melayu*'.

The success of the first congress prompted the organisation of another in 1940. This second congress was a bigger meeting that involved delegates from the Borneo states of

Brunei and Sarawak. The congress made even greater demand to speed up Malay development and participation in Malaya's economy. Among some of the resolutions included a demand to preserve Malay culture and for the Malays to take an active role in the running of the colonial administration. Other important suggestion raised in the congress was the appointment of Malays as Assistant Director of Education. The congress also urged the colonial government to appoint Malay representatives in its entire external mission and to make English education available to Malays.⁹²

The above description yet again demonstrates how the formation of the FMS, far from emasculating Malay political dominance, set off a series of institutions that contributed to the growth of a pan Malay consciousness. The preservation of Malay *de jure* power produced distributional consequences. Malay political participation at the apex of British colonial institutions, allowed Malay actors to make demands for resources, resulting in the agglomeration of Malay based institutions. The development of these institutions should not be seen as independent parts of Malay political expression. Rather, the timing of these institutions only show that they reinforced each other in developing Malay capacities and political expression.

It is obvious that Malay society in the 1940s was a completely different society from that in the nineteenth century. The 1940s saw the coming into form, nascent as it may be, of Malay political and social expression. This nascent form was given its full shape in the years after the Japanese occupation in 1945. The Malayan Union proposal provided the platform for a consolidated show of Malay nationalism. We turn now to this episode.

MALAYAN UNION

One prime reason for the Malayan Union project was to serve Britain's economic objective and streamline administrative tasks. The colonial office made clear that Malaya was an indispensable part of the empire as it could help resuscitate Britain's weakened post war economy. Malaya's rubber and tin industry for instance was the biggest contributors to the British economy.⁹³ Another motivation for the Malayan Union was to respond to Malaya's new plural society. British administration felt that there was a need to incorporate the Chinese community who had emerged as an important economic and political actor.⁹⁴

The net effect of this, is that the Union proposal is yet another attempt at tweaking further Malay political arrangement; this time it was not just *de facto* but also *de jure* Malay political power. The Union would create a unitary state which would amalgamate the

Federated Malay States (FMS), the Unfederated Malay States (UMS) and the Straits Settlements (with the exception of Singapore) into one political entity. With the Union, Malaya would fall under Britain's foreign jurisdiction act - a British crown colony - that 'will render unnecessary any further dependence on Treaties with rulers in any future revision of the constitutional arrangements.'⁹⁵ The Union would replace existing practice of indirect rule through the Sultans. In place of indirect rule, there would be a central administration headed by a Governor based in Kuala Lumpur. The Union would also grant non-Malays citizenship status, employ equal citizenship rights and revoke Malay special status.

The timing and hasty manner in which the proposal was put together, however, triggered strong Malay reaction. First, the British administration could not have picked a worse time to push for such radical proposal. The Malayan Union project coincided with an unprecedented ethnic strife just after the Japanese occupation.⁹⁶ The ethnic clash plus a broken post-war economy only aided Malays sense of insecurity and anxiety. This conjuncture of events sparked off an unprecedented show of Malay nationalism.

More importantly, the manner in which the proposal was made to the Malay rulers triggered vehement Malay political protest. In making the proposal to the Malay rulers, Harold McMichael, the British official in charge of obtaining the rulers' approval, was brazen in his approach. The rulers were not allowed time to think through the proposed changes. They were also not briefed on the specifics of the proposal as the details of the Malayan Union were still being worked out during McMichael visit.⁹⁷ The Sultan of Kedah for instance complained that McMichael's high handed approach gave him little option but to agree with the proposal. He remarked that

'I was presented with a verbal ultimatum with a time limit, and in the event of my refusing to sign the new agreement, which I call the instrument of Surrender, a successor, who would sign it, would be appointed Sultan. I was told that this matter was personal and confidential, and was not allowed to tell my people what had taken place.'⁹⁸

In another letter the Sultan of Selangor wrote of McMichael's haste and strong arm tactics, saying:

'.... I replied, 'I have [knowledge of the proposal], but they are not very clear to me.' Sir Harold said 'The object of the Union is to ensure peace and progress...I ask your Highness and the other Rulers to give your consent and not to be a recalcitrant.....but the sole purpose of my coming here is to obtain Your Highness' signature.'⁹⁹

McMichael's hasty attitude and the timing of the proposal which came amid massive ethnic strife created the right mix for a show of Malay expression. For the Malays, there was a well placed fear - real or perceived - that the Malayan Union would only relegate Malay political dominance. Malay organisational life picked up where it left off before the war. In Johor - which incidentally was the state that saw the worst ethnic clashes between August 1945 and March 1946 - the *Persatuan Melayu Johor* (Johor Malay Association) felt that their rights had been sold off by the Sultan and made clear that they no longer wanted Sultan Ibrahim of Johor to be their ruler. In December 1945 Onn Jaafar, an officer in the Johor civil service and a member of the Federal Council mobilized mass protest against the Union.¹⁰⁰ The show of Malay protest gathered momentum from December 1945 and became more intense after the release of the details of the Union in January 1946 and reached its climax in April 1946. In March 1946, a party called the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) was formed in Johor. The UMNO primary objective was to urge the British government to reverse the Malayan Union proposal. The UMNO made several initiatives. First, it pressured Malay rulers to rethink the Malayan Union project which the rulers subsequently did by making petition to the King of England. Second, the UMNO also lobbied for external support by asking ex- British Malayan officials to petition against the Union. The high point was the UMNO's ability to galvanise Malay grassroots support and pressured Malay rulers to boycott the ceremony that marked the installation of the new Governor General of the Malayan Union. These incessant demands by the UMNO and its supporters resulted in the Malayan Union project being abandoned in May 1946. In mid July 1946, the British government, the UMNO and Malay rulers agreed to replace the Malayan Union with a Federation agreement. An interesting point is that the working committee put in place to draft the Federation agreement were made up of UMNO members and Malay rulers. The drafting of the Federal constitution was finalized by mid-December 1946.¹⁰¹

The significant point of such policy turnaround is that in its attempt to weaken further Malay *de facto* power and tweak Malay *de jure* power, the Malayan Union proposal only resulted in the strengthening of Malay nationalism and restoration of Malay *de jure* power. The invitation extended to the UMNO members in drafting the Federation constitution and the restoration of Malay rulers as head of Malay States consolidated Malay political influence. In short, Malay *de jure* power remained unblemished.

CONCLUSION

We have demonstrated that Malay nationalism is not an ad hoc display involving actors and issues, but rather one that takes on a path dependent process. In trying to manage Malay political arrangement which was deemed to be incompatible to British economic objectives, initial colonial policy attempted to abolish Malay feudal structures. These policies however, did not go far enough; British policies only managed to weaken *de facto* power but not *de jure* Malay power. British policies calculations then continued to incorporate Malay political role within its institutional structures. This special Malay status within the colonial administration set in motion the development of Malay political and social capacities which translated into greater administrative roles, wider access to education and economic opportunities and gave rise to new forms of Malay institutions, which, in the aggregate, resulted in the rise of Malay nationalism in the twentieth century.

In showing the build up to Malay nationalism, the article has demonstrated two important characters of path dependence. First, that small, contingent event could produce large consequences; one where an initial event sets a particular course of action that would prove difficult to reverse. The Birch murder and the consequent preservation of Malay *de jure* paved the way for British policies to continue to factor Malay political significance and created institutions that built Malay institutional capacity. Second, the article has also highlighted that the nature of public good delivery creates self reinforcing mechanism. Initial choice becomes 'lock-in' as coordination and learning effects stabilise actors' expectations and contribute to the perpetuation of specific behaviour and strategies.¹⁰² Put differently, path dependency explains the 'inertia' and 'stickiness' of institutions and why choosing alternative choice become increasingly difficult.¹⁰³ When put this way, path dependence could offer a powerful explanation to a larger project on explaining Malaysia's state building process. Indeed it could provide powerful insight in appraising Malaysia's development posture, in understanding the pace in which Malaysia makes institutional changes and in explaining its resistance to change.¹⁰⁴

NOTES

¹ (Abdullah 1974) p 94 and p. 107

² Among other things, the Union would see a unitary state and place Malaya under Britain's foreign jurisdiction act and the granting of equal citizenship rights. Draft Directive on Policy in Malaya in Appendix I of the report of War Cabinet Committee on Malaya and Borneo, CAB 98/41, dated 18 May 1941 in (Cheah 1979) p.. 12

³ (Stockwell 1979) p. 66

⁴ (Stockwell 1979) p. 66

⁵ From Edward Gent to SS of Colonies, 29 April 1946, CO 537/1548

⁶ This is put forward by Harry Benda, in a reprint of (Roff 1967). Refer to p. ix

⁷ (Sewell 1996) pp 245 - 80

⁸ (Goldstone 1998)

⁹ (Mahoney 2000) p. 507

¹⁰ (Levi 1997) pg. 265

¹¹ (Pierson 2004) p. 21

¹² The four features highlighted are large set up or fixed costs. Given the large amount of investments and high fixed costs, individuals and organisations have higher incentives to stay on a particular technology or stick to a particular options; Learning effects is a phenomenon to show that once we are good at something we tend to better at innovating it rather than seek something entirely new; coordination effects relates how current adoption of techniques would encourage the tying up with other related techniques to make to make it more attractive; adaptive expectations relates to how the adoption and prevalence of an option will limit our future choices, as we tend to not want to pick future 'wrong' choices and would hatch our bet on choices that would be 'successful'. Read (Arthur 1994) pg. 112

¹³ (Krasner 1988), (Thelen 2006);(Pierson 2000a) and (North 1990b) all discuss path dependency to varying degrees and to varying level of emphasis.

¹⁴ (Pierson 2004) p. 33

¹⁵ (Pierson 2004) p. 34

¹⁶ (North 1994) p.3

¹⁷ (Pierson 2004) p. 35

¹⁸ Quoted in (Pierson 2004) p. 35

¹⁹ (North 1990a) p. 362

²⁰ (Pierson 2004) p. 39

²¹ Cited in (Pierson 2004) p. 39

²² (Kennedy 1962) pg. 171

²³ The British government needed to bring military troops from India to quell the unrest. Birch's murder emptied the Straits Treasury and caused the colonial office to tap the Colonial Fund. Cited in (Sadka 1968) pg. 96

- 24 Minute by Herbert Meade, 21 January 1876 on Jervois to Carnarvon, 17 December 1876, CO 273/81; Ord to Anson, 28 December 1875, Anson Correspondence in (Sadka 1968) pg. 95
- 25 25 10 December 1876, No. 218, Lord Carnarvon to Jervois in (Parkinson 1960) pg. 271
- 26 Hugh Low to Robinson, 28 May 1878, enclosed in Robinson to Hicks Beach, 171 of 13 June 1878, CO 273/94 cited in (Sadka 1968) pg. 103
- 27 Acting Governor to All Residents, 19 December 1893 cited in (Sidhu 1980) pg. 18
- 28 (Emerson 1964) p. 176
- 29 Another reason often given to the formation of the FMS is that it was meant to offload the financial burden of the state of Pahang. Pahang was touted to bring large mineral resources by the likes Swettenham. Such economic promise did not materialise and Pahang became a financial burden. In 1895, Pahang expenditure was two and half time that of its revenue, and the mining proceeds, that was touted to form the bulk of Pahang's revenue, was less than 5 percent of the combined revenue of mining proceeds from the other three states . (Andaya 2001)pg 185
- 30 (Kennedy 1962) pg. 239
- 31 Given the disquiet among the rulers on the secondary role played by states, Sir John Andersen in his speech at the opening of the council gave the assurance that nothing would change existing arrangement. He said
- ‘It was no small sacrifice of individuality on the part of the rulers to enter on the compact of Federation....they have done this in the full confidence based on the fact of the past that whatever is done either by the British or by this council...will always be scrupulously observed...They are confident that we will never forget that our powers are derived wholly from their gift, and that we are here in a Malay country as the advisers and counsellors of its Malay sovereigns.’ in High Commissioner to Resident General , 16 December 1905, in High Commissioner to CO, Confidential Desp., 10 February 1906, CO 273/1906
- 32 (Emerson 1964) pg. 149
33. The term British Malaya was first used by Governor Frederick Weld in 1883 during a presentation to the Royal Colonial Institute but the term was not used in any official document by British officials until 1903 when Frank Swettenham used the term to describe his ambition of having a Malay empire that encompassed Burma, the Straits Settlements and North Borneo. See (Roff 1967) pg.91
- 34 Reports on the Federated Malay States for 1897 C.9108 pg.3
- 35 Reports on the Federated Malay States for 1897 C.9108 pg.4
- 36 Minutes of the sessions of the Conference of Chiefs of the FMS held at the Conference Hall, Kuala Lumpur, on 21 to 23 July 1903, Supplement to the Selangor Government Gazette, October 1903 cited in (Sidhu 1980)pg. 119)
- 37 High Commissioner to Resident General , 16 December 1905, in High Commissioner to CO, Confidential Desp., 10 February 1906, CO 273/1906
- 38 (Huessler 1981) pg. 240 Notes on G E Gent's talks with Sultan Iskandar, 2 August 1924 CO 717/39. Governor to Secretary of State, 1 October 1924, CO 717/34, Proceedings of the Federal Council, 25 Nov 1924, Sultan's letter to Collins, 13 August 1924 CO 717/39 . Also (Roff 1967) pg. 198

39 The new arrangement was also prompted by the disagreement between Governor Guillemard and Resident General Maxwell, on the proper role of the Resident General with respect to his relationship with the Governor. As a result of the tussle between scope of power between Resident General and the High Commissioner where the former at times, because of the superior knowledge of the Malay States, overruled the views and decision of the High Commissioner, Governor Andersen, changed the name Resident General to Chief Secretary to reflect a more subordinate role.

40 Proceedings of the Federal Council, 1926, B55. Text of the agreement for the reconstitution of the federal council, dispatch 295, 13 May 1927, CO 717/55/7457

41 (Roff 1967) p. 97

42 Federated Malay States Annual Report on Education for 1903 p.5 cited in (Roff 1967) pg. 100

43 Wilkinson to Resident General February 24, 1904, printed under para 18 of the Minutes of the Conference of Residents, March 1904, R-G File No. 422 of 1904 cited in (Roff 1967) pg. 100

44 The first Malay vernacular school was set up in Klang, Selangor in 1875 and the first Malay school in Perak started in 1883 Selangor State Secretariat 108/80; Perak Annual Report 1883, Selangor State Secretariat 1880 – 1887, 2123/87 cited in (Sadka 1968) pg. 289. Also, Education was provided by individuals and centred on Islamic education

45 Various Annual Reports

46 (Roff 1967) pg.104

47 (Treacher 1907) pp 503-504

48 Federal Council Proceedings, 1915, p. B67

49 Education in Malaya, British Empire Exhibition: Malayan Series (London, 1924) p.15, taken from (Roff 1967) pg. 141

50 Winstedt Report 1917 cited from (Roff 1967) pg. 140

51 The college curriculum went beyond what Windstedt had in mind. Rather than just train teachers in agriculture, handicrafts and gardening, the college founding headmaster T S Dussek introduced literary education on Malay language and culture in the hope that the graduate teachers would help upgrade the quality of vernacular education in the Malay States. To encourage graduate of the college to join the British administration, Dussek also promoted the idea that Malay language be used in government at the local level. In the initial years, textbooks from the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) were used. The use of Indonesian texts could well influence the thoughts of some its graduates towards Malay nationalism. This is because, at the time, there were significant nationalistic movement in Indonesia against Dutch colonial rule. (Roff 1967) pg. 147

52 The KMM was inspired by the Indonesian nationalist struggle and went underground to subvert the British colonial administration

(Noor 2004) pg. 30

53 Resident General's Office, Circular No. 68, 1902 cited in (Roff 1967) p. 99

54 It should also be noted that in the early years after the Pangkor Treaty, appointment of Malays into state administration was minimal. They involved Malay rulers and chiefs who were co-opted into State functionaries as members of the State Councils and as officers such as Assistant District Officers, tax collectors and village headmen. These officers were not trained and that officers were recruited on an adhoc basis and that the appointment of Malay officers was to compensate the loss of income incurred by Malay chiefs' as a result of the dismantling of the feudal order. (Puthucheary 1978) p. 10

55 The scheme was initially called the 'scheme for the Employment of Malays (Higher Subordinate Class) but renamed 'Malay Probationer Scheme'. Under the scheme, the boys were first handpicked by individual Resident and short listed by the Resident General. They were then made to go through a three year course at the Malay College and given training in correspondence, treasury work and other administrative related subjects. Once completed, these graduates were appointed to the Malay Administrative Service (MAS).

56 (Roff 1967) p. 105

57 Memorandum on the principal differences between the 1910 and 1917 schemes cited in (Roff 1967)

58 Annual address of the high commissioner, Federal Council Proceedings (1920) p. B65 cited in (Roff 1967) p. 114

59 See (Roff 1967) p. 116

60 See (Roff 1967) pp 117 - 119

61 Despatch, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, No. 682, December 11, 1923 in Letter, Association of British Malaya to Under-Secretary of State for Colonies, June 27, 1923 in Despatches re Correspondence with the Association of British Malaya on the Administration and Finances of the Federated Malay States, Appendix No. 4 to Federal Council Proceedings (1924) pp C94-95 in (Roff 1967) p. 117

62 Clause 12 (viii) of the General Orders for FMS Government Establishments, as amended in 1923, provided that for posts requiring a knowledge of Malay but of no other language, preference should be given to Malays. Cited in (Roff 1967) p. 118

63 (Roff 1967) pp 119

64 Federal Council Proceedings 1934, p. B58

65 (Roff 1967) p. 109

66 (Roff 1961) pp 1 - 6

67 Roff, 1961 #369} pp 1 - 6

68 (Roff 1967) p. 166

69 (Emmanuel) p. 1

70 In Al-Imam 1 July 1906 cited in (Roff 1967) pg. 56 In another column entitled Nasihat al-Emir Abdul Rashid ia-itu Raja Afghanistan kepada anaknya al-Emir Habib al-Khab (Advice from Emir Abdul Rahim, Ruler of Afghanistan to his son Emir Habib al-Khab), the writer pointed out the need for Malay rulers to promote economic development, encouraged education and create awareness among Malays on the social changes before them Al -Imam 2 November 1907 in (Roff 1967) p. 58

71 Malay Mail, December 1st 1923

72 Saudara, 15th October 1932

73 Majallah Guru, March 1930 pp 47 – 48, cited in (Soernarno 1960) p. 12. In (Toynbee 1931) p. 156 he said: 'When I touched at the Straits Settlements on my way out east I realized that British Malaya was destined, by 'peaceful penetration' to become a new Chinese province, and I fancy, from what I have heard that the same destiny may be in store for Burma, Siam, French Indo China, Dutch Indonesia and the Philippines.' Cited in (Emerson 1964)

74 The Majaallah Guru (Teachers' Magazine) mostly carried articles concerning Malays underdevelopment. With years, the Majallah Guru became a major journal of reference. Its distribution went beyond the teaching community. It drew general readers who were encouraged by articles that were heavy on issues of Malay underdevelopment and critical of British policies that were deemed to hamper Malay economic and political progress

75 Majallah Guru June 1931, p. 42 cited in (Soernarno 1960) p. 12

76 (Roff 1967) p. 174

77 See (Milner 1995)

78 (Lian 2001) pp 865 - 866

79 Also see (Milner 1987) pp 97 - 110

80 31 May 1939 and 1 June 1939

81 Among other notables publications were those by the Persekutuan Perbahathan Orang Orang Islam (Muslim Debating Society) which published a fortnightly magazine called Lidah Teruna (The Youth's Voice). There was also the Maharani Company, a trading set up that ran a fortnightly publication called Perjumpaan Melayu (The Malays Meeting) which later was replaced by a publication called Panji Panji Melayu (Malay Honours). Despite their niche set up, the Lidah Teruna (Persekutuan Perbahathan Orang Orang Islam) and the Panji Panji Melayu (the Maharani Company) the magazines surprisingly covered issues beyond their niche areas, touching on Malays developmental issues and the need to cultivate common communitarian interest among Malays. Read (Roff 1967) pp 160 - 162

82 Zaaba for instance held appointment at the influential Sultan Idris Training College (SITC) and he would go on heading various Malay publication. Burhannuddin Helmy and Yaacob Ibrahi, were graduates of SITC who would become the editors of Utusan Melayu and later headed the left wing Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM). Ishak Latiff, was an ex civil servant, who would go on to publication and the setting up of the KMM. Onn Jaafar, who would become a leading figure in Malay politics was a member of the Johor State Council and also held editorial appointments at Warta Malaya and Lembaga Malaya. Eunus Abdullah was a member of the legislative council, President of the Kesatuan Melayu Singapore and key figure in Utusan Melayu.

83 (Soernarno 1960) p. 10. Read also (Weiss 2005)

84 the request was initially turned down in 1927 by the Colonial Secretary the colonial administration eventually gave in to Eunus' request. In 1929, it granted Malays a stretch of land in the eastern part of Singapore called Kampong Melayu.'The colonial Secretary said

there was little that the British government could do as ‘the pushing out of the Malays is really an economic matter’ Legislative Council Proceedings , 1927 pp B24 – B25, B35

85 Read (Roff 1968) p. 117

86 (Roff 1967) pp 239 - 242

87 (Soenarno 1960)

88 KMM was influenced by the the Djong Djava and Jong Sumatra political struggle (Soenarno 1960) p. 18

89 Ibrahim Yaacob, *Nusa dan Bangsa Melayu (Malay Country and People)*, Djakarta, 1957 pp 59 – 60 cited in (Roff 1967) p. 222

90 (Noor 2004) pp. 32 - 33

91 Under the support of the Japanese government, Ibrahim acquired the daily Malay newspaper *Warta Malaya* to launch propaganda against the British authority. In 1940, Ibrahim and few of his followers, M which included Ishak Mohamed, Ahmad Boestamam and Sutan Djenain were arrested by the British authorities and imprisoned. They were later released by the Japanese in 1942. (Roff 1967) p. 234. During the Japanese occupation, Ibrahim Yaacob worked closely with the Japanese forces and he was made Commander-in-chief of the Malay arms group called *Pembela Tanahayer (Defenders of the Homeland)* or PETA. See (Soernarno 1960)p.20

92 (T.H. Silcock 1953) p. 285

93 Read (Lau 1989)

94 As Lau (1989) points out, in the 1930s the British administration had floated the idea of citizenship rights to Chinese given the rise of Chinese transnationalism and the need to circumvent Chinese government citizenship rule of 1929 regarding the citizenship status of overseas Chinese.

95 Draft Directive on Policy in Malaya in Appendix I of the report of War Cabinet Committee on Malaya and Borneo, CAB 98/41, dated 18 May 1941 in (Cheah 1979) p.. 12

96 After the Japanese surrendered, the MCP conducted their own ‘people’s court’ where suspected Japanese collaborators were rounded up, given trial and if found guilty summarily executed. MCP’s action took on ethnic dimension. MCP’s provocative moves targeted Malays, on grounds of collaborating with the Japanese forces. Though there were Chinese among the collaborators, they were small in number. Malays and Indians however were employed by the Japanese and - unlike the Chinese – played little role in the resistance against the Japanese. It was obvious to any observer at the time that the MCP self- styled execution would take on ethnic proportion. See (Cheah 1977) pg. 70

97 McMichael was also reprimanding in action. He was given the permission to check on the Malay rulers’ involvement during the Japanese war and should he find them corroborating with the Japanese, McMichael was given the authority to recommend another Malay personage who he deemed competent to sign the treaty.

98 The Sultan of Kedah to Sir Frank Swettenham cited in (Allen 1967) pg. 169

99 The Sultan of Selangor to Lord Marchwood, 18 February 1946, cited in *Debates on the Straits Settlements (Repeal) Bill in the House of Commons on 8 March 1946* taken from (Allen 1967) in Appendix D, excerpt D.5. pp 170 - 171

100 On 21 August 1945, there was violent Chinese-Malay skirmishes in district of Muar-Batu Pahat, in the Johor State and the BMA reported that refugees in Muar amounted to 10,000 where in Batu Pahat, there were 4000 see (Cheah 1977) pg. 70

101 (Sopiee 1976) pp 38 - 39

102 (Ertman 1997); (Pierson 2000a) and (Thelen 2006) p. 219

103 (North 1990b) p. 104. Also in (Goldstone 2006)p. 220

104 (Abdillah 2007) p. 8

REFERENCES

- Abdillah, Noh. 2007. 'Institutions and Change: The Case of Malaysia's New Economic Policy.' In *FEA Working Paper Series*. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya.
- Abdullah, Munshi. 1974. *Hikayat Abdullah*. Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara.
- Allen, James de V. 1967. 'The Malayan Union.' In *Monograph Series No.10, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University*.
- Amri, Baharuddin Shamsul. 1997. 'The Economic Dimension of Malay Nationalism - The Socio-Historical Roots of the New Economic Policy and its Contemporary Implication.' *Developing Economies*, XXXV (3):240 - 61.
- Andaya, Barbara Watson, Andaya Leonard Y. 2001. *A History of Malaysia*. second edition ed. London: Oxford University Press.
- Arthur, W. Brian. 1994. *Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Berman, Sheri. 2003. *Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society*. 2 vols. Vol. 1.
- Cheah, Boon Kheng. 1977. 'Some Aspects of the Interregnum in Malaya (14 August-3 September 1945).' *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 8 (1):48 - 74.
- . 1979. *The Masked Comrades*. Singapore: Times Book International.
- . 1988. 'The Erosion of Ideological Hegemony and Royal Power and the Rise of Post.' *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 14 (1).
- Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. *Shaping the political arena : critical junctures, the labor movement, and regime dynamics in Latin America*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- David, Paul A. 1985. 'Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.' *The American Economic Review* 75 (2):332-7.
- Emerson, Rupert. 1964. *Malaysia: a study in direct and indirect rule*. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press.
- Emmanuel, Mark. 'Viewpapers: The Malay press of the 1930s.' *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 41 (01):1-20.
- . 2010. 'Viewpapers: The Malay Press of the 1930s.' *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 41 (1):1-20.
- Ertman, Thomas. 1997. *Birth of the leviathan : building states and regimes in medieval and early modern Europe*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Goldstone, Jack A. 1998. 'Initial Conditions General Laws, Path Dependence and Explanation in Historical Sociology.' *American Journal of Sociology* Vol. 104 (No.3):829 - 45.
- . 2006. 'Comparative Historical Analysis and knowledge accumulation in the study of revolutions.' In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed. J. a. D. R. Mahoney. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Huessler, Robert. 1981. *The British Rule in Malaya: The Malayan Civil Service and its Predecessors, 1867 - 1942*. Oxford: Clio Press Ltd.
- Kennedy, Joseph. 1962. *A history of Malaya, AD 1400-1959*. London: Macmillan.
- Krasner, Stephen. 1988. 'Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective.' *Comparative Political Studies* 21:66 - 94.
- Lau, Albert. 1989. 'Malayan Union Citizenship.' *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 20 (2).
- Levi, Margaret. 1997. 'A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis.' ed. M. I. L. a. A. S. Zuckerman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lian, Kwen Fee. 2001. 'The Construction of Malay Identity across nations Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.' *Bijdragen tot de Taal - Land-en Volkenkunde* 157 (4):861 - 79.
- Mahoney, James. 2000. 'Path Dependence in Historical Sociology.' *Theory and Society* 29:507 - 48.
- Milner, A. C. 1987. 'Colonial Records History : British Malaya.' *Modern Asian Studies* 3 (2):76 - 82.
- . 1995. *The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Noor, Farish. 2004. *Islam Embedded*. Vol. 1. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute.
- North, Douglass C. 1990a. 'A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics.' *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 2 (4).
- . 1994. 'Economic Performance Through Time.' *The American Economic Review* 84 (3):359-68.
- North, Douglass Cecil. 1990b. *Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Parkinson, C. Northcote. 1960. *British Intervention in Malaya 1867 - 1877*. Singapore: Singapore University Press.

- Pierson, Paul. 2000a. 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.' *American Political Science Review* 94:251 - 67.
- . 2004. *Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Puthuchery, Mavis. 1978. *The Politics of Administration*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Roff, William. 1961. *Guide to Malay Periodicals 1876 - 1941*. Singapore: Singapore.
- . 1967. *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*. New Haven, C. T.: Yale University.
- . 1968. 'The Persatuan Melayu Selangor.' *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 9.
- Rokkan, Stein. 1975. 'Dimension of State Formation and Nation Building : A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations in Europe.' In *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. C. Tilly. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sadka, Emily. 1968. *The Protected Malay States 1874 - 1895*. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press.
- Sewell, William H. 1996. *Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology*. Edited by T. McDonald. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Sidhu, Jagjit Singh. 1980. *Administration in the Federated Malay States, 1869 - 1920*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Soenarno, Radin. 1960. 'Malay Nationalism, 1896 - 1941.' *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 1 (01):1-28.
- Soernarno, Radin. 1960. 'Malay Nationalism 1900 - 1945.' *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 1 (1):9 - 15.
- Sopiee, Nordin. 1976. *From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation*. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press.
- Stockwell, A J. 1979. *British Policy and Malay Politics During the Malayan Union Experiment 1945 - 1948*. Kuala Lumpur: The Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
- T.H. Silcock, Ungku Aziz. 1953. 'Nationalism in Malaya.' In *Asian Nationalism and the West*, ed. W. L. Holland. New York: Macmillan.
- Thelen, Kathleen Ann. 2006. 'How Institutions Evolve.' In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed. D. R. Mahoney James. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Tilly, Charles, and Gabriel Ardant. 1975. *The formation of national states in western europe* : ed. by charles tilly. Contributors.- gabriel ardant and others. Princeton, Nh: Princeton University Press.
- Toynbee, A J. 1931. *A Journey to China or Things Which Are Seen*. London.
- Treacher, W H. 1907. 'British Malaya, with more special reference to the Federated Malay States.' *Journal of the Society of Arts* 55.
- Weiss, Meredith. 2005. 'Pricky Ambivalence: State, Society and Semidemocracy in Malaysia.' *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 43 (1):61-81.
- Wuthnow, Robert. 1989. *Communities of Discourse: Ideologies and Social Structure in the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and European Socialism*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.